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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JA~IES R. HENRY, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WASHIKI CLUB, INCORPORA'~l_lED,' 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal frorn an Order of the District 
Court of Weber County granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. In the lVl'emorandum filed by 
Defendant at the tin1e the ~fotion was heard, Defend-
ant contended: 
1. That under the facts and circumstances of the 
case there was no duty on the part of the Defendant 
to Plaintiff, and therefore Defendant was not guilty of 
any negligence. 
2. ~rhat ·Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence and assurnption of risk as a rna tter of la-\v. 
The facts of the case are as follows : 
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The Plaintiff is an industrial tool designer ( Jin1 
Henry Deposition Page 11), who at the time of sus-
tainip.g his injuries was employed in Ogden, Utah, for 
Tool Research Company in this capacity (Ji1n Henry 
Dep. 2 and 11). On April 24, 1959, the Plaintiff worked 
his regular shift which ended at about 5:00 p. 1n. (Jim 
Henry D·ep. P 18); he left \vork and arrived home at 
about 6:00 P.M. (Jin1 Henry Dep. P 18). He and 
his wife had previously made arrangen1ents to go to 
dinner with two other men who were employed in a 
similar capacity by his employer (Jim Henry D'ep. P 18). 
Plaintiff, upon arriving home, changed clothes; there-
after he went to the State Liquor Store where he pur-
chased a pint of whiskey and then returned hon1e (Jim 
Henry Dep. P 18). About 7:30 P.M., ~Ir. Phipps, 
(Jack Phipps Dep. P 3), a fellow e1nployee, arrived at 
Plaintiff's residence; and Plaintiff, his wife, and 1\ir. 
Phipps went to the Combo (Kitty Henry Dep. P 4), 
where they met a Mr. Redman (Jack Phipps Dep. P 4), 
also a fellow employee (Kitty Henry Dep P 4). While 
at the Combo, Plaintiff had one 1nixed drink \vhich he 
estimated contained about one ounce of \vhiskey (Kitty 
Henry Dep. P 5, Jim Henry Dep. P 20-21, J aek Phipps 
Dep. P 4). The four people then \Yent to ~Ir. Phipps' 
apartment while 1\lr. Phipps changed clothes (l{itty 
Henry Dep. P 21); the group then went to Graycliff 
Lodge in Ogden Canyon, Utah, for dinner, arriving at 
about 9:30 P.M. (Kitty H'enry Dep. P 7, Ji1n Henry 
Dep. P 22). While they "\Vere \vaiting to be served, 
Plaintiff had one mixed drink ( J aek Phipps Dep. P 7, 
Kitty Henry Dep.P 7, Jin1 Henry Dep. P 23). At Grey-
cliff Lodge, Plaintiff had a large steak dinner ( J aek 
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I:)hipps Deposition P 6-8), after which the group pro-
eeeded to the Cornbo, arriving there shortly before 12 
midnight (Kitty Henry Dep. P 10 and 12, Jim Henry 
Dep. P 24). Plaintiff and his friends were at the 
Cornbo until 12:45 A.M. (Jin1 Henry Dep. P 27), and 
during that tin1e he had two mixed drinks (Jim Henry 
Dep. P 22) .. The group then walked from the Combo 
to the Washiki Club located in the basement of th·e 
Ogden Hotel (Kitty Henry Dep. P 14, Jim Henry Dep. 
P 27). On arriving at the Washiki Club, each person 
paid $1.00 for a so-called membership card, valid for 
that particular evening only (Jim Henry Dep. P 28). 
While at the Washiki Club, Plaintiff had one or possibly 
two 1nixed drinks (Kitty Henry Dep. P 15 and 16, Jin1 
Henry Dep. P 22). Between 1:30 to 1:45 A.M., Plain-
tiff and his wife made the suggestion that they go home, 
and Plaintiff stated that he wanted to go to the rest-
rooln before leaving (Kitty Henry Dep. P 16 and 17, 
Jim Henry Dep. P 32 and 33). The description of the 
physical layout of the W ashiki is necessary for an 
understanding of the events that followed. The bar 
in the club is located in the Northeast corner of a large 
room containing tables and a small dance floor. Over 
the bar the ceiling is lowered to give a canopy like efffect. 
Directly to the North of the bar are located the Men's 
and Ladies' rest rooms. There is a small neon sign 
designating these rest rooms, but this sign is obscured 
by the canopy over the bar from the view of persons 
sitting at most of the tables in the larger room. It is 
impossible to see the rest roorn signs from the tables 
near the rear of the roon1 (McKinley Dep. P 6 and 1~). 
Plaintiff and his 'vife were seated at table~ near the 
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rear, or the south side of the roon1 (Jim Henry Dep. 
P 29 and 30). On the south wall of the room is a neon 
sign which says "DINING R001f OPEN". On the 
night in question, this sign was not lighted (McKinley 
D·ep. P 6). The lighting in the rnain room was ver'T 
dim (Jim Henry Dep. P 33, Affidavit McKinlev P 7 
and 8). Under neath the "DINING R001\I" sign were 
two swinging doors ( lVfcKinle~v Dep. P 12) leading into 
a room, now used as a store roorn, which roon1 had 
previously been used as a kitchen (i\IcKinley Dep. P 
6). This room was lighted by a single globe of about 
25 watts intensity, (McKinley Dep. P 7 and 8) located 
in the most easterly end of the room. In thi~ store 
room was a stack of beer and soda water cases, a large 
galvanized sink that ran part way across the roon1 
which served as sort of a partition dividing the room 
into two parts, a service entrance opening to the alley, 
and a door leading to a sump purnp located do,,rn a 
flight of concrete steps (NicKinley Dep. P 9). 
Plaintiff had been to the W ashiki Club on one 
previous occasion about six months previous to the 
night in question (Kitty Henry Dep. P 14, Jim Henry 
Dep. P 28). He testified that he had no recollection 
of using the rest roon1 at that tinre (Jim Henry Dep. 
p 32). 
Plaintiff got up from his table and walked toward 
the double doors at the back of the roorn, assurning 
that these doors led to the restroorn ( Jin1 Henry Dep. 
P 33). Plaintiff passed through the doors; he then 
walked through a passage,vay in the store roorn and 
made a tur11, and this was the last he rernernbered until 
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he recalled crawling up a stairway (Jiin Henry Dep. 
P 34). In the fall down the stairs, the Plaintiff re-
ceived a severly corninuted fracture of the right wrist 
(Kitty Henry Dep. P 22, Doctor's staternent,) together 
with bruises and contusions. The fracture of the right 
wrist has resulted in a per1nanent disability for Plain-
tiff. His work consisted of doing highly technical de-
tailed engineering drawings related to specialized 
n1achine tool design. As a result of the injuries he sus-
tained in this fall, it is now impossible for him to draw 
at all (.Jim Henry D·ep. P 48). 
STATE.MENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANrr'S NEGLIGENCE 
WAS ONE, OF FACT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SUB~IITTED TO THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEF,ENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUl\fl\fARY JUDG~\IENT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAl~ COURT ERRED IN FAII_jiNG TO SUB-
1\IIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO A 
JURY, AND IN Irrs GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S 
~lOTION FOR ~Ul\IlVIARY JUDG11ENT. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS ~ro WHETHER HE 
WAS AN INVITEE·. OR LICENSEE WAS A QUEST-
ION OF F ACrr FOR THE Jl1 RY, AND ~~HE TRIAL 
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COUR1_, ERRED IN GRANTING SU~I~IARY ,JUDG-
MENT TO THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL CO-URT ERRED IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANT'S l\IOTION FfJR SU:\I~\1..:\.RY JUDG~\IENT 
IN THAT THE FACTS BEFORE TI-IE COURT PRE-
SENTED ~rRIABLE ISSUES. 
POINT I 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE 
WAS ONE OF FACT THAT SHOULD HAVE BE,EK 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDA~T'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\IENT. 
Upon a n1otion by the defendant for Sunm1ary Judg-
ment, the evidence of the plaintiff should be taken as 
true, and all reasonable inferences and presumptions 
indulged which tend to support the position of the 
plaintiff. The question n1ust be submitted to the jury 
if the facts are such that reasonable 1ninds 1night reach 
different conclusions thereon. 
J>laintiff bases his clai1n of negligence on the part 
of the defendant on the follo,ving: Defendant knev. .. 
that prior to plaintiff's injury that other persons had 
mistakenlly assu1ned that the doors leading to the kit-
chen and to the stairw·ay, \Vhl'l'e plaintiff \\·as injured, 
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were doors leading to restrooms (McKinley Dep. P 7) 
8). Despite the fact that defendant had actual know-
ledge of the likelihood that a patron would assurne that 
the doors through which plaintiff passed led to rest-
rooms, defendant took no action to lock the doors; to 
bar the particular door leading to the cellar; or to post 
a notice of warning of any kind on the doors until after 
plaintiff's injury (McKinley Dep. P 7). 
Is it not reasonable to assun1e that the ·exercise of 
due care on the part of the defendant would require 
the defendant, who had actual knowledge of the fact 
that eustomers were prone to assume that the door in 
qu·estion led to restrooms, to at least post a sign stating 
''El\IPLO.YEES ONLY", "KEEP OUT", "NO ADMIT-
rrANCE" '"DO NOT ENTER" or "PRIVATE" or any 
' ' ' . 
words that would give a patron an indication that the 
doors did not lead to a portion of the premises which 
a parton might norrnally be expected to have access to~ 
The law is well settled that when an owner or 
occupier of business premises has reason to apprehend 
danger to a patron from a particular situation on the 
premises, and that there is a possibility of injury to 
the patron frorn such situation, then in such event, the 
question as to "\vhether or not the occupier had violated 
his duty toward the patron becomes a question of 
fact for a jury to be deterrnined upon the evidence. 
In the case of Campbell 'liS. Weathers, 111 P 2d 72, 
77, 78, the Suprerne Court of Kansas quoted the follo\v-
ing language fron1 Bass vs. Hunt, 100 P 2d 696, with 
approval: 
•'It is the duty of a restaurant keep·er to 
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k~ep in a reasonably safe condition the portions 
of his establishment where his guests may be 
expected to come and go, including a necessary 
water closet and a passage thereto, and it can-
not be said that as a matter of law that there 
was no actionable negligence in his failure to 
sufficiently light the passage,vay or to 'varn 
a guest of an unlighted stairway covered by a 
trap door which was not closed. * * * Appellant 
had the right to assume if the hallway 'vas not 
in a reasonably safe condition warnings signs 
would be erected to appraise hin1 of lurking 
danger, or that he would have been otherwise 
notified concerning it." 
Section 343-d, The Restatement of Torts set~ fnrth 
the duty owed a business visitor: 
"WHAT BUSINESS VISITOR ENTITLED 
TO EXPECT: A business visitor is entitled to 
expect that the possessor will take reasonable 
care to ascertain the actual condition of the 
premises and, having discovered it, eith'er to make 
it reasonably safe by repair or to give "Tarning 
of the actual condition and the risk involved 
therein." 
Section 343-b of the Restatement of Torts deals 
with the law in regard to a business visitor's use of the 
wrong door while on the business premises. 
"If the possessor has intentionally or negli-
gently misled the visitor into reasonable belief 
that a particular passageway or door is an ap-
propriate means of reaching the business area 
the visitor is entitled to the protection of a busi-
ness visitor "Thile using this passage,yay or door.·~ 
It is certainly reasonable to assunie that rest roon1s 
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for patron~ are part of the business area of a night club. 
Plaintiff contends that an examination of all of the 
farts and c-ircumstances of his injury clearly indicates 
that he was ntisled in his search for a restroom by the 
negligence of the defendant. 
The question of ho\Y far the business area extends, 
and the question of reasonable action on the part of a 
business visitor were before the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Martin vs. Jones, 253 P 2d, 359 (Utah 
1953). In this case, the plaintiff entered Defendant's 
drugstore to make som·e purchases. Except for the 
bottled liquor counter, prescription counter, and soda 
fountain, customers were allowed to pick up and handle 
1nerchandise in the store without the assistance of th'e 
clerks. Plaintiff's evidence showed that he purchased 
razor blades and tablets for which he had paid; he 
asked for an automatic pencil and was told by the clerk 
that they were displayed on a shelf by the liquor counter. 
Plaintiff then proceeded to the rear of the store. He 
stated that he observed no signs barring his admit-
tance, and that he saw nothing unusual about the floor 
by the counter, alhough the floor was shadowy. As 
he reached up on tip-toe to remove a display card from 
the shelf about seven feet above the floor, he took a 
step sideways on what appeared to hi1n to be the floor 
and suddenly fell down a dumb-waiter shaft into the 
basen1ent eight or ten feet below. Defendant's en1ploy-
ees testified that when the clerks waited on plaintiff, 
he said nothing about \vanting a pencil, and the clerks 
,vent on serving other custo1ners. One clerk testified 
that when she next observed appellant, he was standing 
behind the liquor counter vvith a display card of pencils 
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in his hand. She went over to him and asked if she 
could serve him. He removed a pencil from the card 
and turned to place the card on the shelf ; and in doing 
so f'ell down the shaft. The clerk said she did not tell 
him that he was not allowed behind the liquor counter. 
She also said that the lighting in the store made the 
open shaft visible, and she thus assu1ned plaintiff could 
see it, so she did not warn hi1n of the danger. D·efend-
ant was able to prove that at the entrance to the rear 
of the counter was posted the sign" No Admittance -
Employees Only". The case 'vent to a jury, and the 
jury returned a verdict No cause of Action. Plaintiff 
appealed and the Court reversed on the ground of 
error in the instructions. The Supreme Court in re-
versing the judgment and ordering a new trial held 
at page 362: 
"A jury could find that ~Irs. Cannon (de-
fendant's clerk) had reason to believe that the 
Appellant did not have notice of and 'vould not 
discover a hazard on the floor behind the counter. 
Assuming that she thought that he read the ·xo 
Admittance' sign as h'e made his 'vay behind the 
counter, she could be charged with the realiza-
tion that he had no reason to believe that his 
admittance was barred because of hazards lurk-
ing, but because the n1anagen1ent did not \Yant 
liquor bottles tampered 'Yith, being under bond 
to the State for their strict account. That there 
should be an open hole behind a counter in a 
modern store where clerks 'vall\: seein8 certainlY 
.., 
extraordinary, raising a jury question as to 
whether the respondent's e1nployees had reason 
to believe that a custo1ner \Vho \vas unfa1niliar 
\vith that part of the store and \vho hnd his ut-
10 
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tention focuS'ed on a display card seven feet 
above the floor would not see an open hole -in 
the floor." 
It is respectfully submitted that there was a1nple 
evidence on the question of negligence on the part of 
the defendant to require the court to submit that issue 
to a jury for determination, and that the trial court 
erred in granting defendant's Motion for Surnmary 
Judgntent. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SU:B-
MIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO 
.l~ JURY, AND IN ITS GRANTING OF DEFEND-
ANT'S l\IOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\1ENT. 
Defendant has contended that Plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law. This 
contention is apparently based upon the claim that there 
was nothing which particularly indicated to Plaintiff 
that the doors through which he passed led to restrooms. 
This contention of the Defendant ignores the testimony 
of McKinley, the operator of Defendant's premises 
(McKinley Dep. P. 8), as well as the testimony of two 
of Defendant's employees, Nixon, the head awiter, and 
Lernmon, a vvaiter (Nixon Dep. P. 10, 11; Lemn1on Dep. 
P. 4, 5 ), all to the effect that other persons have made 
the san1e assurnption that plaintiff 1nade regarding 
vvhere the doors in question led. The cited portions of 
the depositions indicate clearly that despite defendant'~ 
knowledge of the erroneous assu1nptions frequently rnade 
by its patrons concerning the location of the re~troo1ns, 
that Defendant still did nothing to provide any form 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of warning to its patrons. The additional fact that 
Defendant's rnanager knew that from the place where 
Plaintiff was sitting it would be impossible for him 
to see the sign which indicated the location of the rest-
rooms must also be considered (1IcKinley Dep. P 6). 
The reasonableness of plaintiff's action in seeking a 
restroom should also be regarded in the light of the 
actions of Carl Gillis as sho\vn by his Affidavit. Gillis 
sought a r'estroom in the identical manner in which 
Plaintff sought one, at a ti1ne shortly after Plaintiff 
passed through the doors in question. 
Plaintiff's position in regard to contributory negli-
gence is well stated in the case of Martin vs. Fox West 
Coast Theater Corportion, 108 P 2d 29, which states 
as follows at page 32: 
"Where different conclusions 1nay be reason-
ably drawn by different minds from the same 
evidence the decision must be left to the triers 
of the fact, and in the instant case it is clear to us 
that whether tire situation in which he (plaintiff) 
found himself was such as to impress upon the 
mind of the (plaintiff) the danger incident to 
going around the front end of a parked autonlo-
bile was for the jury to decide as an issue of 
fact. The question of contributory negligence 
is always one of fact for the jury to decide under 
proper instructions, except in those cases in 
which, judged in the light of common kno,vledge 
and experienc'e, there is a standard of prudence 
to which all persons silnilarly situated n1ust con-
form. It is only in these last narned casc~s that 
failure to adhere to that con1n1on ~tandard 
is a~ 1natter of la\v of contributorY neo·li 0 't:lnce. ,, 
. b t:-
12 
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The Utah case of lYioore vs. Miles, 158 P 2d 676 
(Utah), deals with a fact situation not dissimilar to the 
one now before the Court. In the Miles case the Plain-
tiff was a guest at Defendant's hotel, and she left her 
roon1 to go to h·er car in the parking lot maintained by 
the hotel to the west of the building. Extending east 
and west across the building on the same floor as Plain-
tiff's room was a hallway, the east end of which turned 
down into the lobby by an ''L" stairway. At the end 
of the hallway was a short flight of steps I·eading di-
rectly to the door leading to the parking lot. Plaintiff 
fell down these steps and sustained a fractured arm. 
The Plaintiff recovered judgment. Defendant appealed 
on the contention: 
a. That there was not sufficient evidence to take 
the case to the jury. 
b. Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a 1natter of law. 
As to the matter of evidence sufficient to take the 
case to the jury, the Court held that under the laws 
of the State of Utah, the defendant had a duty of keep-
ing the hallways of the hotel properly lighted, and that 
since there was evidence of failure to keep them prop·erly 
lighted, the question of the Defendant's negligence 'vas 
one for th·e jury to deterrnine. 
On point b., the defendant contended that the testi-
rnony showed that the west end of the hall 'vas so dark 
that plaintiff could not Hee the stairs; that plaintiff 
was walking slowly feeling ahead with her foot; that 
sh·e lost her balance and fell down the short flight of 
steps to the door,vay; and that this action on her part 
13 
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1nade her guilty of of contributory negligence· as a 
matter of law. Defendant further argued· that si1i"ce 
Plaintiff had a choice of going do,vn the .stair,vay to 
the lobby which was a well lighted passageway, or going 
down the west stairway which was dark, that she was 
negligent as a matter of la\v because she chose the 
route which proved to be unsafe. In ans,vering the 
question of contributory negligence the court said at 
page 677: 
"The next question for consideration is 
whether Plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law in proceeding do,vn 
the darkened hallway knowing that the stnir,vay 
was at the end thereof. In this jur·isdiction 'U:c 
are committed to the doctrine that the quest,ion 
of ·contributory negligence is one for the jury, 
different conclusions may be reasonably dra·Lcn 
by different minds from the same ecidence." 
(emphasis ours) 
The court further said at page 678: 
"In view of the foregoing authorities and 
the long established rule in this jurisdiction, that 
contributory negligence is a question for a jury, 
we hold that the issue of contributory negligence 
was properly sub1nitted to the jury by the trial 
court." 
The case of Flanigan vs. Madison Pla.z:a Grill, Inc. 
30 Atlantic 2d 38, dealt with a 1nistake of the Plaintiff in 
regard to the door which led to the l'eBtl'OOlll. r_rhe facts 
in this case are as follo\vs : The Plaintiff \vho \vas 
previously unfarniliar 'vith defendanfs restaurant en-
tered between 9 and 10 P.l\L; she left her con1panions 
in a booth and proceeded down a din1ly lighted eorri4or 
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which a sign indicated as the way to the restroo1n and 
telephones. She noted a sign over a door indicating 
that it was the 1nen's room; adjacent thereto was another 
door which was slightly ajar through which a light 
showed, and whieh was marked "Private"; but plaintiff 
testified she did not notice the sign marked "Private". 
Plaintiff stepped through this door and fell down the 
cellar steps, and in the fall she was injured. 
The Court held that the question as to whether she 
used reasonable care was one of fact. The court 
stated at page 39 : 
"The location and construction of these 
rooms off the corridor, which were such that it 
was not an unreasonable assumption on the part 
of the plaintiff, entering the premises for the 
first time that the door which she op·ened was in-
tended for ladies in view of the circu1nstanee~ 
that she did not observe the sign 'Private' on this 
door when she opened it". 
~rhe Court further held that if she mistakenly 
thought she was entering the ladies' room, it could not 
be ass tuned that she expected to find a staircase there. 
"She had no duty to 1nake constant obser-
vation or to proce·ed with Inore than reasonable 
care, and that whether or not she proceeded ,,·ith 
reasonable care vvas a question of fact for the 
Jury." 
A Motion for a directed verdict vvas properly re-
fused because the court held the evidenee showed that 
Plaintiff had not exceeded her invitation, and that she 
\Vas not guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter 
of la,Y. The court further held that contributory negli-
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gence does not autoinatically follow because the accident 
might have been avoided. The reasonableness of her 
action under the circumstances was held to be a question 
of fact for the jury. 
In the case of Hall et ux. vs. Boise Payette Lumber, 
125 P 2d 311, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
stated as follows on a matter closely allied to the n1atters 
before the court in the instant case, quoting at page 313: 
"Whet:lrer maintaining an unlocked door 
swinging in and over a precipitous stairway down 
into a dark basement; whether maintaining such 
a door without warning sign thereon, or any 
hint that the door led into a basement and not 
into another room; whether maintaining such a 
door opening into a dark basement abruptly de-
scending from the threshold to the first step; 
whether the absence of a railing on the east side 
of the stairway, leaving that side without any-
thing to catch hold of, with a eement well on the 
west side; and, whether the failure of the Inana-
ger to warn Mrs. Hall consituted negligence on 
the part of appellant, and whether the acts and 
conduct of Mrs. Hall constituted contributory 
negligence, were questions for the fury. Stearns 
v. Graves, 62 Idaho ________ , 111 P 2d 822, 884; 
Byington v. Horton, 61 Idaho 389, 401, 102 P 2d 
652, 657; Asumendi v. Ferguson, 57 Idaho 450, 
465, 65 P 2d 713." (Emphasis ours) 
"Furthermore, conceding, but not deciding, 
that one person might reasonably dra"- the con-
clusion that the n1aintenance of the door in ques-
tion in the circu1nstanC'es hereinabove 8tated did 
not constitute actionable negligence, another 
n1ight, with equal reason to say the least, con-
clude it constituted actionable negligence. . rrhi8 
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court held in Fleenor r. Oregon Short Line R. 
Co., 16 Idaho 781, 102 P 897; 
•• 'Where the evidence on 1naterial facts is 
conflicting, or where on undisputed facts reason-
able and fair-minded men may differ as to the 
inferences and conclusions to be drawn, or where 
different conclusions might reasonably be reached 
by different minds, the question of negligence is 
one of fact to be submitted to the jury'". 
Denton v. City of Twin Falls, 34 Idaho 35, 
28 P 2d 202; Call vs. City of Burley, 57 Idaho 
69, 62 P 2d 101; Bennett v. Deaton, 57 Idaho 752, 
767, 68 p 2d 895." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Stickle vs. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 251 P 2d 867 at Page 870, 
122 U. 477, discussed the question of a finding of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law as follows at 
Pages 870, 871 : 
"Contributory negligence is an affirmative 
defense and the burden rests upon the defendant 
to prove it by preponderance of the evidence. 
* * * If evidence were such that reasonable 1nen 
may fairly say that they are not convinced fro1n a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty 
of negligence, the court could not rule that he 
was negligent as a matter of la\v and take the 
case from the jury. * * * 
"In our democratic ~y~ten1, the people are 
the repository of power whence the la\\T is de-
rived; from its initiation and creation to its final 
application and enforce1nent, the la\v is the ex-
pression of their will. The functioning of a eros~-
section of the citizenry as a jury is thP n1ethod 
by which the p·eople express this \vjl} in the ap-
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plication of law to controversies which arise 
under it. Both our constitution and _statutorY 
provisions assure trial by jury to citizens of thi~ 
state * * * 
"A very fine statement of the proper attitude 
toward this right was expressed for this court 
by the late 1\ir. Justice Frick in N eu·ton ~·s. Ore-
gon Short Line Railroad Co. where, in referring 
to the question of submitting plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence to a jury, he made these state-
ments : 'The Court can pass upon the question 
of negligence only in clear cases. * * * unless 
the question of negligence is free from doubt, the 
court cannot pass upon it as a question of laV~r 
* * * if.* * * the court is in doubt wh'ether reason-
able men, * * * might arrive at different con-
clusions, then this very doubt detern1ines the 
question to be one of fact for the jury and not 
one for law for the Court." 
Plaintiff submits that it is certainly reasonable to 
assume that fair minded men may arrive at different 
conclusions from the evidence of plaintiff's actions on 
the night of his injury, and that, therefore, the 1natter 
should have be'en submitted to the jury, and the trial 
court erred in granting the n1otion for Summary J udg-
ment. 
POINT III 
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF 
WAS AN INVITEE OR LICENSEE UNDER THESE 
FACTS PRESE,NTED A QUESTION OF FACT FOR 
THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX 
GRANTING SUl\IlVfARY JUDGl\1:ENT TO THE DE-
FENDAN'J~. 
18 
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Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff can1e 
upon its prernises as a business visitor, and that he was 
thereb~r entitled to he regarded as an invitee. Defend-
ant contended to the trial court that Plaintiff, in leaving 
the area of the premises 'vhere the tables and chairs 
were located and in passing through the un1narked 
door~ in search of a restroom, lost his status as an in-
vitee, and he thereby became a licensee. Plaintiff would 
lose his status as an invitee only if his action in seeking 
a restroom in the manner he did was unreasonable under 
all of the circumstances. In considering what was reas-
onable under the circumstances, one must give regard 
to the fact that the sign indicating the location of the 
restroorns was not visible from the area where Plaintiff 
\vas sitting. (McKinley dep P. 6); that Plaintiff had 
been in Defendant's establish1nent only once before, 
and that he did not recall using the restroom at that 
time; and that there was no sign indicating that the 
doors through which Plaintiff passed led to an area 
that was restricted in any \vay (~fcl(inley Dep P 6 & 7). 
In fact, the unlighted neon sign above the door stated 
HDining Roo1n OPEN". 
In the case of H ectus 'VS. Chicago Transit Company, 
Illinois, ( 1954) 122 NE 2d 587, the Court in discussing 
the facts that bore on Plaintiff's status as an invite'e or 
a trespasser said at pages 589, and 590: 
"With respect to Defendant's contention that 
Plaintiff 'vas a tr·esspasser, it argues that Plain-
tiff was roaming about on a part of Defendant's 
pren1ises where he had no right to be.. . 11hi~ 
argument is based on the theory that the 1nen'~ 
washroo1n in the Loop \Vas intended for the ex-
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elusive us·e of defendant's employees. The evi-
dence on this point is conflicting. There \vas 
evidence, however, tending to prove that the 
washroom was used by the public. A police of-
ficer testified that he used the men's \vashrooin 
on many occasions at night for a period of t\vo 
years prior to the accident; and that he sa\v per-
sons not employed by the Defendant use it, and 
that he never found the door locked. l\Iotornu1n 
Corcoran admitted that he 'gave lot of guy,~' other 
than employees of the defendant 'favors by open-
ing the door for them'. Another .:\Iotorman stated 
that • the washroom was us·ed by streetcar pas-
sengers and other people. 
Whether plaintiff was an inL·itee }J'resented 
a question of fact for the jury to deteTnzine. \\T e 
think the 'evidence is ample to warrant the find-
ing that the Plaintiff was an invitee. See 
Eliguth vs. Blackstone Hotel, Inc. 408 Ill. 343, 
97 NE 2d 290; Larson vs. Illinois Central RaiZ.icay 
Co., 2 Ill. App 2d, 102, 118 NE 2d 886." (emphasis 
ours). 
Whether or not an invitee exceeds the lilnits of his 
invitation is dep·endant upon the facts of each case. If 
the use of the pre1nises by the injured person is \vithin 
the bounds of the use with which the owner may reas-
onably contemplate, then in such a case the invitee is 
within the limits of his invitation despite the owner's 
contention that the invitation did not extend to the 
particular area where the injury occurred. In the case 
now before the Court the knowledge of the operator 
and n1anager of the Defendant's pre1nises of the fre-
quency with which the doors concerned had been nlis-
taken for doors leading to restroon1s, roupled \Yith the 
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failure of the D'efendant to "\varn of the nature of the 
area to which the doors led, strongly support Plaintiff's 
eontention that he \vas still within the area of his in-
vitation when he sustained his injuries. Harper and 
Jan1es in their work on The Lau' of Torts, Vol. 2, at page 
1486, discuss the law question no\v before the court and 
state as follows: 
"If, on the other hand, a defendant arranges 
part of his prernises, leading a visitor reasonably 
to think they are included in the area of invita-
tion, he will be held as an invitor as to that part 
even though he did not mean to invite plaintiff 
to it." 
The question of a Plaintiff's rnaking an erroneous 
choice of doors, and receiving injuries resulting frorn 
such error was discussed by the Massachusetts Suprerne 
Judicial Court in the case of Palmer vs. Boston Penny 
Savings Bank, ~lass. 17 NE 2d 899. In this case the 
facts \vere as follows: Plaintiff parked his car at a 
public garage intending to call for it later that night; 
he received a clairn check fron1 the atendant and l'eft 
by the san1e door he had entered. Plaintiff had never 
been to the garage before. This garage had three en-
trances, a large center door for n1otor vehicles, and on 
each side of the center door and a few feet away an 
ordinary sized door. The \Vesterly of these ordinary 
sized doors led directly into the garage; the easterly 
door led to a stairway which "\Vent down to a boiler roorn. 
Plaintiff returned to the garage late at night, found 
the large center door locked, and he erroneously as-
sunled that the easterlY door was the door he had used 
previously; he opened the doo1·, and fell do\\Tn a dark 
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stair"\\ray. The Court held at page 902: 
"The main question is whether or not Plain-
tiff could have been found to have been an in-
vitee in using the easterly door as an entranc·e 
to the place where his automobile 'vas stored. 
It is cl'ear there was no express invitation for 
him to do so. But the jury could consider the 
location of the three doors and the apparent pur-
pose for which they were intended. They could 
find that the center door "\\7as locked at a tin1e 
when the Defendant's premises were not closed 
to business, and that it was reasonable to expect, 
in the abs·ence of any sn1aller door in the center 
door which would permit a person to enter the 
garage, that another means of ingress was avail-
able for the use of persons who came to get their 
automobiles. * * * We cannot say under that 
such circumstances, with others appearing in 
the evidence, when considered in conjunction with 
each other, were not sufficient fairly to consti-
tute a representation that the Easterly door w·as 
intended as an entrance to the garage. The 
plaintiff was entitled to rely to a reasonable ex-
tent upon appearances even though he misjudged 
the actual situation. The fact that this door 
was left unlocked did not of itself constitute an 
invitation to enter, but the Plaintiff 'vas en-
titled to have this fact viewed in the light of all 
the attending circumstances. If the jury could 
find, as we think they could, that the Plaintiff 
was an invitee at the time he was injured, then 
it is clear that the deteru1ination of Defendant'~ 
negligence was properly left to the jury.'~ 
In the Texas case of J.ll o ntg o nz ery vs. Allis-Chalmwrs 
Mfg. Co., 164 S. W. 2d 356, the plaintiff and her husband 
entered the defendant's place of business to discuss the 
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purchas'e of far1n implernents. While plaintiff's hus-
band was conducting his business with defendant, plain-
tiff desired to use the ladies rest room. There was no 
one present in the display room from. whom she could 
inquire as to the location of the rest room. Plaintiff 
rnistakenly entered an unlocked, unrnarked door which 
led to the basement, believing this door to be the en-
trance to the ladies rest room she was seeking. She 
fell dovvn the stairs to the basement and was injured. 
The trial court granted judgment for defendant; plain-
tiff appealed and was granted a new trial. In discus-
sing the questions of negligence on the· part· of the de-
fendant and contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff the Court stated at 557, 558: 
"However, under the liberal indulgence of 
inferences, in1plications and intendrnents in such 
cases, we are of opinion that, \Vhether or not, in 
the exercis'e of reasonale care, the defendant 
corporation should have anticipated that a per-
son situated as was plaintiff's vvife, n1inus the 
named precautionary measures, would likely 
mistake and enter th'e unlocked and unnamed door 
under the belief that it opened in to the ladies' 
r·estroom, was a question of fact and not one of 
law; nor do we think it can correctly be said, a~ 
a matter of law, that she was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. 
"The doctrine we think applicable. to the 
situation presented, is announced in , 38 A'JJte r. 
Jur. (subject Negligence), p 796, 135, a.s follo,v:-;: 
'It is vvell settled that where a store, office "Quild-
ing, or similar business establishrneht · to ·\vhi(~h 
the public is irnpliedly invited has a doo1· lead:i'ng 
to a cellar, elevator shaft, or other dangerot1s 
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place, which is left unfastened, and which, fron1 
its location and appearance, may be mistaken 
for a door which a member of the public on the 
premises is entitled to use, the proprietor j~ 
liable to a person who by mistake passes through 
that door and is injured.' " 
Under the fact situation presented to the court 
in the instant case, any question as to whether the plain-
tiff was an invitee or a. licensee at the time of sustain-
ing his injuries was a proper question of fact for the 
jury to determine, and the Trial Court was in error in 
granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DE-
FE,NDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT IN THAT THE FACTS BEFORE THE 
COURT PRESENTED TRIABLE ISSUES. 
Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy and one 
that should not be granted except upon a clear show-
ing that there were no issues as to any material facts. 
Plaintiff earnestly contends that where the defendant 
failed to warn its patron of the danger of its open stair-
way, where the 'evidence was clear that Defendant had 
knowledge of the propensity of patrons to seek a rest-
room in the area back of the dining roorn that negli-
gence on the part of the defendant beca1ne an issue that 
was entitled to be sub1nitted to the jury. Likewise the 
plaintiff was entitled to have the question of the r'eason-
ableness of his action in seeking a rest roo1n in the rear 
of the prernises subrnitted to the jury. 
It is well settled that to authorize the granting of 
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a Su1n1nary Judg1nent, the con1plete absence of any 
genuine issue of facts must be apparent, and all doubts 
thereon 1nust be resolved against the party moving for 
a Sununary Judgment. 
The following language frorn Peckham vs. Ronrico 
Corporation, 7 F.R.D. 328 was cited with approval by 
the New Mexico Suprerne Court in McLain vs; Haley, 
207 P 2d 1013 at page 1014: 
H(1) That Rule 56 should be cautiously invoked 
to the end that the parties may always be af-
forded a trial where there is a bona fide dispute 
of facts between them. 
"(2) That a litigant has a right to a trial where 
there is the slightest doubt as to the facts." 
The Court at the hearing on a 1vlotion for Sum-
rnar~v Judgment should not attempt to try th'e issues 
between the parties but should merely ascertain whether 
in fact there is an issue. 
In the case of Petersen vs. Alkema et ux, 261 P 2P. 
175, the Utah Supre1ne Court said at Page 177: 
"While in a given case a toolrnay be so sirnple 
and the employee so familiar with it that the 
Court would be corr'ect in holding as a 1natter 
of law that he cannot recover, the case at bar i~ 
not such a case, but one which the couYt sho,ulrl 
have heard all the evidence before deterrnining 
wheth'er there was a breach of dltty by the plain.:. 
tiff so as to nullify a possible breach of duty :by 
the Defendant." ( En1phasis ours). 
Based on the foregoing grounds the Suprerne (jourt 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vacated the action of the trial court in granting sum-
mary Judgment to the Defendant and remanded the 
cause for trial. 
It is submitted that depositions and affidavits are 
a dangerous and unsatisfactory substitute for oral testi-
mony before a ccurt and jury. The right of examin-
ation and cross examination in the presence of the triers 
of the fact has often been acclain1ed as one of the 1nost 
valuable attributes of the con1mon lavv system. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the Summary Judgment in favor of the 
defendant should be reversed, and the case r'emanded 
to the trial court for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Pete N. Vlahos and 
David S. Kunz, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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